Robb Willer
466 Barrows Hall
Department of Sociology
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720
Phone: (510) 643-5444
E-Mail: Willer@berkeley.edu
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Robb Willer466 Barrows Hall Department of Sociology University of California Berkeley, CA 94720 Phone: (510) 643-5444 E-Mail: Willer@berkeley.edu |
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I am affiliated with the University of California, Berkeley's Survey Research Center, the Institute for Personality and Social Research, the Institute of Business and Economic Research, and the Institute for Cognitive and Brain Sciences. I am also the Director of the Sociology Department's new Laboratory for Social Research, a member of the Greater Good Science Center's Executive Committee, a member of the Cognitive Science faculty, and a Senior Consultant for The Breakthrough Institute.
Robb Willer. Forthcoming. “Groups Reward Individual Sacrifice: The Status Solution to the Collective Action Problem.” American Sociological Review.
Robb Willer. Forthcoming. “No Atheists in Foxholes: Motivated Reasoning and Religious Ideology.” In Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification. Eds. John T. Jost, Aaron C. Kay, and Hulda Thorisdottir.
Brent Simpson and Robb Willer. 2008. “Altruism and Indirect Reciprocity: The Interaction of Person and Situation in Prosocial Behavior.” Social Psychology Quarterly. 71:37-52.
Ko Kuwabara, Robb Willer, Michael W. Macy, Rie Mashima, Shigeru Terai, and Toshio Yamagishi. 2007. “Culture, Identity, and Structure in Social Exchange: A Web-based Trust Experiment in the U.S. and Japan.” Social Psychology Quarterly. 70:461-79.
Robb Willer. 2007. “The Role of Metanetworks in Network Evolution.” Journal of Mathematical Sociology. 31:101-119.
Pat Barclay and Robb Willer. 2007. "Partner Choice Creates Competitive Altruism in Humans." Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences. 274:749-753.
Damon Centola, Robb Willer, and Michael W. Macy. 2005. “The Emperor’s Dilemma: A Computational Model of Self-Enforcing Norms.” American Journal of Sociology. 110(4):1009-40.
Robb Willer, Lisa Troyer, and Michael J. Lovaglia. 2005. “Influence Over Observers of Structural Power: An Experimental Investigation.” The Sociological Quarterly. 46:263-77.
Robb Willer. 2004. “The Effects of Government-Issued Terror Warnings on Presidential Approval Ratings.” Current Research in Social Psychology. 10(1): 1-12.
Michael J. Lovaglia, Robb Willer, and Lisa Troyer. 2003. “Power, Status, and Collective Action: Developing Fundamental Theories to Address a Substantive Problem.” In Advances in Group Processes, Volume 20. Eds. Shane R. Thye, John Skvoretz, and Edward J. Lawler. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Michael W. Macy and Robb Willer. 2002. “From Factors to Actors: Computational Sociology and Agent-Based Modeling.” Annual Review of Sociology. 28:143-66.
Robb Willer and David Willer. 2000. “Exploring Dynamic Networks: Hypotheses and Conjectures.” Social Networks. 22:251-272.
I am interested in various fundamental research questions about society and interaction: How do groups successfully achieve collective action? How is masculinity enacted in everyday life? How do unpopular norms emerge and persist? Why are people altruistic? Is altruism contagious? My research is currently centered around two broad themes: (1) the foundations of basic human sociality, and, (2) the social psychology of political attitudes.
My research on human sociality is concerned with what factors are responsible for prosocial behaviors and sentiments (e.g. altruism, trust, collective action participation, reciprocity, prosocial norm enforcement), and how these behaviors and sentiments allow humans to sustain social order. How do status hierarchies and individuals' reputational concerns help groups achieve collective action? What are the contributions of personality and situation to the production of prosocial behavior? To what extent is altruistic behavior a product of genetic heritability versus social factors (e.g. developmental, interactional, structural)? How is it that humans achieve social order when evolutionary pressures appear to oppose cooperation and generosity? How is generalized exchange sustained in groups despite individuals' temptations to free-ride? I am working on a variety of interrelated empirical projects using diverse methodologies related to these questions.
In other research I am interested in what factors lead individuals to adopt liberal or conservative political attitudes. In a series of laboratory experiments I have studied the interplay of masculinity, threat, and testosterone in political ideology, finding that men's maintenance of a masculine gender identity may lead to the adoption of certain political attitudes associated with masculinity (e.g. support for aggressive international policies). I have also investigated the effects of fear of terrorism and system instability on political conservatism in the contemporary United States. Most recently I have looked at what factors lead individuals to support military action, finding that individual levels of distrust and predjudice ("fear and loathing") contribute to Americans' support for a variety of war scenarios.
In general, I try to employ the method (e.g. experimental, survey analysis, physiological measures, modeling) most useful for gaining leverage on a given research question. Below I review some of my ongoing and past research projects.
Collective Action and Status
My dissertation research addresses a central puzzle of social science: How is social order possible among individuals who are tempted to behave selfishly? Why and when do individuals pursue social goals rather than egoistic ones? My research develops and evaluates an explanation of how the “free-rider problem” of collective action can be overcome by individuals’ desires for social status, and the availability of increased status for those who contribute to public goods.
In a series of laboratory experiments, I show that contributors to collective action (a) enjoy improved status in the eyes of group members, (b) have greater influence on subsequent group tasks, and (c) benefit from “indirect reciprocity” in the form of gifts (without any quid pro quo) as well as higher rates of cooperation in two uniquely structured dyadic cooperation opportunities. Results suggest that contributions are a sign of generosity, rather than wealth or the ability to contribute (as suggested by most costly signaling accounts), or a sign of obligation to reciprocate (as suggested by exchange theory). The fourth study investigated the group-level impact of status rewards for contributions, indicating that they promote productivity, solidarity, and identification.
Robb Willer. Forthcoming. “Groups Reward Individual Sacrifice: The Status Solution ot the Collective Action Problem.” American Sociological Review.
Masculine Overcompensation
Another line of my research investigates the dynamics of “masculine overcompensation,” the idea that men react to masculine insecurity with extreme demonstrations of masculinity. Previous research suggests that extreme demonstrations of masculine-typed behaviors may be rooted in insecurity. However, these cross-sectional correlations do not establish a causal link, nor do they address how and whether men change their attitudes when their gender identity is threatened. I designed an experiment in which men and women were randomly assigned feedback on a gender identity survey suggesting that they were either masculine or feminine. I then assessed study participants’ attitudes on survey measures I found to be indicative of masculinity in an earlier survey study. While women showed no change as a result of the type of feedback received on the gender identity survey, men showed a variety of exaggerated masculine-typed attitudes. Compared to men given masculinity-confirming feedback, men given feedback threatening their masculinity expressed greater homophobia, greater support for the Iraq war, and greater interest in purchasing an SUV, relative to other vehicles. I am conducting follow-up research (with Christin Munsch) investigating whether masculine overcompensation is related to attitudes towards women and violence against women. Another follow-up study (with Christabel Rogalin and Bridget Conlon) investigates the possible mediating role of increased testosterone in masculine overcompensation.
This research has received media coverage from Science, the Chicago Tribune, Harper's, Men's Health, The Advocate, Car and Driver, the AAAS, CNN, The Rush Limbaugh Show, and elsewhere.
Robb Willer. “Overdoing Gender: A Test of the Masculine Overcompensation Thesis.” Manuscript in preparation.
Unpopular Norms
Unpopular norms are theoretically puzzling from both functionalist and rational choice perspectives, which attribute norms to collective or individual interests in preventing others from imposing negative externalities. Yet the social psychology literature is rife with cases of groups conforming to undesirable norms. Damon Centola, Michael Macy, and I used agent-based modeling to explore the effects of network structure on the diffusion of support for unpopular norms.
Subsequently, Ko Kuwabara, Michael Macy, and I conducted a series of experimental studies investigating under what conditions people will enforce unpopular norms. We completed two studies that show individuals respond to social pressure not only by conforming to a norm they privately oppose, but by pressuring others to do so as well. In the context of a wine-tasting, participants not only fell in line with a group norm to praise a certain wine, but also sanctioned a lone deviant who correctly identified the wine as identical to the others. This finding suggests one mechanism for how a group can become trapped in behavioral patterns that nearly everyone privately dislikes.
Robb Willer, Ko Kuwabara, and Michael W. Macy."The Enforcement of Unpopular Norms." Revise and Resubmit.
Damon Centola, Robb Willer, and Michael W. Macy. 2005. “The Emperor’s Dilemma: A Computational Model of Self-Enforcing Norms.” American Journal of Sociology. 110(4):1009-40.
Contagious Altruism and Generalized Exchange
I am interested in the phenomenon of generalized exchange, when unilateral gift-giving emerges along chains of individuals, such as in the Kula Ring. Generalized exchange can be driven by “generalized reciprocity,” or the tendency of a person to "pay forward" favors received from others in the past. If altruism is contagious it would imply that the goodwill behind favors you have received may have originated with people you don’t even know; likewise, favors that you pay others may go on to benefit total strangers.
I conducted three experiments on the existence and dynamics of generalized reciprocity. In the studies participants were given opportunities to give money from a pool to the next participant in the study, after themselves receiving either a fair or raw deal from the previous participant in the study. I found that people tended to give more to others if they had themselves received greater amounts, i.e. altruism was contagious. This result persisted even when affordability of altruism and normative information were experimentally controlled. Survey measures suggest further that neither emotional reactions nor belief in karma account for the result. I am working now on a field study of the dynamics of generalized reciprocity in natural settings.
Robb Willer. “Is Altruism Contagious? The Dynamics of Generalized Exchange.” Manuscript in preparation.
Altruism and Reputation
Much of my recent research concerns the relationship between reputational incentives and prosocial behavior (actions which benefit other individuals). In 2007, Pat Barclay and I investigated two distinct reputational incentives for prosocial behavior. We showed that people may behave prosocially in order to increase generosity from others in future interactions, but also to gain access to these relationships in the first place. Further, we found that when others can select the people they would like to interact with it can create "competitive altruism."
In a project with Brent Simpson, we analyze how different individuals respond to reputational incentives in their prosocial behavior. We classified study participants a priori as either "altruists" or "egoists." We found that those classified as altruists tended to be less responsive to reputational incentives, behaving generously regardless of whether others would know their behavior. However, egoists tended only to give when their reputations were at stake. We have since conducted follow-up research on the effect of social values on indirect reciprocity behavior and the interaction of self-regulatory depletion and social values.
Pat Barclay and Robb Willer. 2007. "Partner Choice Creates Competitive Altruism in Humans." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. 274:749-753.
Brent Simpson and Robb Willer. "Altruism and Indirect Reciprocity: The Interaction of Person and Situation in Prosocial Behavior." Forthcoming. Social Psychology Quarterly.
Terrorism and Presidential Approval
The threat of terrorism has been a defining aspect of the Bush presidency and a contributing factor to his reelection. In a 2004 paper I analyzed the effects of government-issued terror warnings on President Bush’s Gallup poll approval ratings. The results of these analyses suggested a positive relationship whereby terror alerts are followed by increases in approval for Bush. I also found evidence that terror alerts lead to increased support for Bush’s handling of the economy. This latter finding may reflect a “halo effect” where support for Bush following terror alerts extends even to aspects of his job performance unrelated to terrorism, e.g. handling of the economy.
I am following up this preliminary research with a broader, multi-method project investigating the pattern. First, I am running further analyses of approval polls using a longer time-series and more poll results. Also, I am conducting two field studies to analyze the effect experimentally.
This research has received media coverage from the USA Today, L.A. Times, The Today Show, N.P.R., and elsewhere.
Robb Willer. 2004. “The Effects of Government-Issued Terror Warnings on Presidential Approval Ratings.” Current Research in Social Psychology. 10(1): 1-12.
Power, Status, and Philanthropy
My dissertation research emerged out of my ongoing interest in identifying the conditions under which structural power leads to status. In a series of experimental studies, my colleagues Michael Lovaglia, Lisa Troyer, Reef Youngreen, and I show that power users can gain status in the eyes of observers. In our studies, power users gain status particularly if they successfully counteract others’ perceptions of them being greedy and selfish through the strategic use of small philanthropic gestures. Our research suggests one answer to the puzzle of how power structures achieve legitimacy and persist over time.
Robb Willer, Lisa Troyer, and Michael J. Lovaglia. 2005. “Influence Over Observers of Structural Power: An Experimental Investigation.” The Sociological Quarterly. 46:263-77.
Michael J. Lovaglia, Robb Willer, and Lisa Troyer. 2003. “Power, Status, and Collective Action: Developing Fundamental Theories to Address a Substantive Problem.” In Advances in Group Processes, Volume 20. Eds. Shane R. Thye, John Skvoretz, and Edward J. Lawler. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Network Evolution
In a recent paper I find that the probability of a network equilibrium is a function not only of the satisfaction of incumbents of the structure, but also the location of the network vis-à-vis other networks in the larger “metanetwork.” A metanetwork is a hypothetical structure linking network forms that are one link manipulation distinct from one another. I find that certain networks are more likely to obtain than others due to their proximity to other networks in the metanetwork. A paper from this project (with Arnout van de Rijt) won the student paper award from the Mathematical Sociology Section of the ASA in 2004.
Robb Willer. 2007. “The Role of Metanetworks in Network Evolution.” Journal of Mathematical Sociology. 31: 101-119.
Robb Willer and David Willer. 2000. “Exploring Dynamic Networks: Hypotheses and Conjectures.” Social Networks. 22:251-272.
Status and Unintelligible Texts
The effects of arbitrary factors on evaluations of academic texts threatens to undermine the quality and integrity of scholarly discourse, as highlighted in the famed “Sokal hoax.” Past research, primarily in natural settings, offers mixed evidence for whether an author’s status biases text evaluations. In an experimental study I found that an unintelligible text penned by a high status author was evaluated as significantly better than that of a low status author, and this effect was mediated by the reader’s impressions of the author’s status and competence. The results further suggest that high academic status could lead readers to evaluate an unintelligible text as intelligible. The research offers insights on the social psychological basis of biased evaluations of scholarship and points to one reason why unintelligible texts might be praised in academic discourse.
Robb Willer. “The Effects of Author's Status on the Evaluation of Unintelligible Texts.” Revise and Resubmit
Fear of Death and Belief in the Afterlife
I am interested in the social psychology of religious belief. Religious belief is almost ubiquitous across time and culture, yet its social psychological antecedents remain only roughly understood. One often-cited factor that may promote religious belief is fear of death. Fear of death may lead to increased belief in the afterlife via a motivated reasoning process, as enhanced afterlife belief may serve to mollify mortality concerns.
In two laboratory experiments, I found that making mortality concerns salient to participants led to greater reported afterlife belief. I have also conducted unpublished research on the possible effect of salience of injustice on belief in God and the effects of religious belief on class consciousness, but have rarely found effects. Summaries of these studies are available from me via e-mail.
Robb Willer. Forthcoming. “No Atheists in Foxholes: Motivated Reasoning and Religious Ideology.” In Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification. Eds. John T. Jost, Aaron C. Kay, and Hulda Thorisdottir.
I have been fortunate to work with the following people on research projects, papers, or articles:
Pat Barclay, Steve Benard, Casey Borch, Damon Centola, Bridget Conlon, Matthew Feinberg, Melissa Ferguson, Francis Flynn, Will Kalkhoff, Dacher Keltner, Ko Kuwabara, Daniel Laurison, Edward J. Lawler, Michael Lovaglia , Michael W. Macy, Barry Markovsky, Rie Mashima, Christin Munsch, Andrew Penner, Christabel Rogalin, Brent Simpson, Shane Thye, Lisa Troyer, Arnout van de Rijt, Henry Walker, Edward J. Walsh, David Willer, Michael Wojnowicz, Toshio Yamagishi, Reef Youngreen